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Abstract 
 
In this essay, I relate material in the original published work – John Stuart Mill 
– Victorian Firebrand (Atlantic Books, 2007) to the claim that the central 
features of Mill’s thought can be seen more clearly through a biographical 
lens. The original contribution of the main work lies in the excavation and 
application of biographical material to the development of Mill’s philosophy.  
 
The poor development of Mill’s utilitarianism results in part from a lack of 
personal investment and aspiration. Mill’s motivation was to atone for earlier, 
premature assaults on Jeremy Bentham’s philosophy - rather than to develop 
it further. As a consequence, his mature utilitarianism is hard to integrate 
with his liberalism, which was where his primary interest lay.  
 
Elements of Mill’s liberalism also bear a biographical imprint. The central 
emphasis on self-creation in Mill’s liberal ethic results, in part, from his own 
‘crisis’ and subsequent departure from the rationalist utilitarianism of his 
father and Bentham. Similarly, Mill’s focus on individuality stemmed in part 
from a concern to demonstrate he was not, himself, a ‘made man’. Open-
mindedness became a central liberal virtue, for Mill, following his criticism of 
Bentham’s (and his father’s) narrowness of thought. Character was also 
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essential to liberty, since only those of strong character could create 
themselves and express their individuality, rather than succumbing to 
custom. 
 
Mill’s partner and later wife, Harriet Taylor Mill, had an influence on Mill’s 
thought. The experience of gossip and ostracism, in the years before their 
marriage, strengthened Mill’s opposition to the ‘despotism of custom’. More 
substantively, Harriet’s views on socialism, the ballot and feminism clearly 
influenced Mill’s own treatment. Without Harriet, he would have been a less 
committed socialist and feminist – and would have remained a supporter of 
the right to vote in secret. 
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1. Introduction: the biographical approach 
 
Mill’s ideas bear a strong imprint of the personal and political circumstances 
of his life. To understand Mill, and his contribution, his life and work must be 
viewed together. Mill was an intensely autobiographical thinker: for him, the 
political and personal were inseparable.1 
  
In this essay, I set out to defend this claim, with particular reference to the 
development of Mill’s utilitarianism and liberalism.2 That there is a 
considerable degree of tension between the two is hardly news. To this day, 
the degree to which the Mill of On Liberty and the Mill of Utilitarianism can be 
reconciled is hotly debated.3  
 
My own view is that the subtleties of Mill’s argument bring the two strands 
closer together than they appear at first glance, but in the end, not close 
enough for reconciliation. Mill’s liberalism crowds out his utilitarianism, or at 
least forces it into a space outside mainstream utilitarian thinking. Mill was a 
weak utilitarian, because he was a good liberal.  
 
In addition, I provide evidence for the influence of Harriet Taylor Mill on his 
work, in particular in the development of his socialism and feminism and 
certain aspects of his political theory. In the main work, I supply fresh 
materials in the form of biographical connections.  
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One argument in favour of this approach is that Mill himself frequently saw a 
strong link between his life and his work. Despite his austere reputation, Mill 
was an unusually self-reflexive thinker, conscious that his ideas were being 
motivated and moulded by his own life, and by his developing perception of 
his own biography.  
 
It is no accident that Mill wrote an Autobiography, or that this has become one 
of his most celebrated works. Part of his motivation for this work was to 
manage his own posthumous reputation, not least with regard to the delicate 
matter of his relationship with Mrs Harriet Taylor. But Mill also fleshed out 
the links between his own development, and the development of his ideas. 
Most vividly, in the chapter titled ‘The Crisis in My Mental History’ Mill 
described how the depression that afflicted him in 1826 and 1827 altered his 
thinking, in ways that would have profound and lasting implications for his 
attempts to reframe utilitarianism, and the moral content of his liberalism.  
 
First, from this point onwards, Mill would see happiness as a by-product of a 
well-lived life, rather than its object: 
 
“I never, indeed, wavered in the conviction that happiness is the test of 
all rules of conduct, and the end of life. But I now thought that this end 
was only to be attained by not making it the direct end. Those only are 
happy (I thought) who have their minds fixed on some object other than 
their own happiness; on the happiness of others, on the improvement of 
mankind, even on some art or pursuit, followed not as a means, but as 
itself an ideal end…Ask yourself whether you are happy, and you cease 
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to be so. The only chance is to treat, not happiness, but some end 
external to it, as the purpose of life. Let your self-consciousness, your 
scrutiny, your self-interrogation, exhaust themselves on that; and if 
otherwise fortunately circumstanced you will inhale happiness with the 
air you breathe, without dwelling on it or thinking about it, without 
either forestalling it in imagination, or putting it to flight by fatal 
questioning. This theory now became the basis of my philosophy of 
life.”4  
 
This reformulation would be expressed, with increasing clarity, in successive 
works by Mill, especially his reviews of Coleridge, Bentham and Whewell – 
and, finally, Utilitarianism itself.  
 
Second, Mill’s liberalism would from this point onwards strongly emphasise 
the development of the character or ‘self-culture’ of the individual: 
 
“The other important change which my opinions at this time underwent, 
was that I, for the first time, gave its proper place, among the prime 
necessities of human well-being, to the internal culture of the individual. 
I ceased to attach almost exclusive importance to the ordering of 
outward circumstances, and the training of the human being for 
speculation and for action…The maintenance of a due balance among 
the faculties now seemed to be of primary importance. The cultivation of 
the feelings became one of the cardinal points in my ethical and 
philosophical creed.”5 [my emphasis] 
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One reason, then, to believe that biographical context will add to our 
understanding of the development and expression of Mill’s ideas is that Mill 
himself, having ‘learnt by experience’, believed it.  
 
This is not to say that Mill’s ideas cannot or should not be examined purely 
on their philosophical merits, detached from biographical context. A bad or 
poorly-developed idea does not become better through a deeper appreciation 
of why it turned out that way. But it can help us to see when the strength or 
weakness of an idea is explicable less by reference to the philosophy, than to 
the philosopher.  
 
As I argue below, Mill was dismissive of Utilitarianism, failing to develop or 
promote what is now one of his most famous works. His ambivalence about 
the work does not alter the work as it stands: but it does alter how we think 
about the place it occupied in Mill’s moral universe. It is not a coincidence 
that Utilitarianism is the only work of any significance that Mill fails to treat in 
any detail in the Autobiography. More substantively, Mill failed to take 
opportunities to clarify and thereby strengthen his treatment – with lasting 
consequences. 
 
Mill’s abandonment of some of the central tenets of the ‘creed’ of 
utilitarianism, into which he had been baptised by his father, James Mill, and 
Jeremy Bentham, took place more quickly than his published works 
suggested - in part because of his fear of, and respect for, his father. By the 
time he published Utilitarianism, Mill had in fact moved on; his focus by this 
point was individual liberty, rather than individual happiness.  
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The character of Mill’s liberalism was also shaped by his own perceptions of 
his early life. He was sensitive to criticism, from those such as Thomas 
Carlyle, that he was a ‘manufactured man’. Not least because he agreed with 
it: 
 
‘I conceive that the description so often given of a Benthamite, as a mere 
reasoning machine was, during two or three years of my life not 
altogether untrue of me.”6  
 
Mill felt trapped by one element of his youthful creed, the ‘associationist’ 
psychology of Hartley, which implied that everyone is shaped by their 
circumstances into the person they are destined to remain. We are what we 
are raised to be:  
 
‘[During] the later returns of my dejection, the doctrine of what is called 
Philosophical Necessity weighed on my existence like an incubus. I felt 
as if I was scientifically proved to be the helpless slave of antecedent 
circumstances; as if my character and that of all others had been formed 
by agencies beyond our control, and was wholly out of our own 
power”.7 
 
Mill’s departure from this brand of psychological determinism was painful, 
both personally and intellectually. But following his crisis, and during 
subsequent bouts of depression, it became vitally important to Mill to feel that 
he was the master of his destiny, living under his own intellectual propulsion. 
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Both Mill’s public rejection of the Benthamite version of utilitarianism and his 
embrace of a Humboldtian, developmental liberalism reflect his private 
journey.  
 
Mill’s liberalism evolved to accommodate both the importance of education 
and childhood for the development of character, as well as the need for 
individual responsibility and self-cultivation. He set great store by individual 
energy and self-creation, and freedom from ‘cramped’, pre-ordained opinions 
and roles. In On Liberty, Mill criticised those who conform to any of ‘the small 
number of moulds which society provides in order to save its members the 
trouble of forming their own character’. It is hard to read this description 
without thinking of how Mill himself saw himself as breaking free from a 
mould provided not by ‘society’, but by his father. 
 
Carlyle described the Autobiography (published after Mill’s death) as ‘the 
autobiography of a steam engine’8. Intentionally or not, Carlyle’s attack was 
even more bitter than it first appears, given what Mill had written in On 
Liberty: 
 
“One whose desires and impulses are not his own, has no character, no 
more than a steam-engine has a character”.9 
 
Mill’s liberalism is founded on the belief that a good life is one lived ‘from the 
inside’, according to the values and beliefs generated through individual 
reflection, learning and experience. Of course we are all influenced by our 
surroundings: our parents, our peers, and the culture and institutions of the 
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society into which we are born. But we are only truly free when our ‘desires 
and impulses’ are our own: when we have our own character, rather than the 
character prescribed for us by others.  
 
For Mill, whose own childhood was a long dose of utilitarianism, these are 
statements not only of philosophy, but biography, too.  
 
2. Utilitarianism 
 
Mill’s relationship with utilitarianism is obscure to this day. Scholars 
sometimes list Mill as a leading utilitarian, along with Bentham. On other 
occasions he is cast among the anti-utilitarianism liberals.  
 
The confusion is understandable. Mill was both an ardent defender and 
devastating critic of utilitarian philosophy. His essay Utilitarianism was 
intended to save utilitarianism from an early intellectual grave, but was so 
poorly executed that it backfired. As the late Victorian philosopher Jevons 
succinctly put it: “Mill explains and defends his favourite doctrine with so 
much affection and so much candour that he finally explains himself into the 
opposite doctrine”.10 Alan Ryan points out that the essay has “become a 
classic through the efforts of its opponents rather than those of its friends”.11 
 
2.1 Motivation  
 
To understand Mill’s motivation in the writing of Utilitarianism, it is necessary 
to go back to the 1830s. During this period, in the aftermath of his ‘mental 
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crisis’, he was being strongly influenced by conservative elements in the 
thinking of Carlyle, Saint-Simon, Tocqueville and Coleridge. Mill himself 
knew that he was considered “a lost sheep who has strayed from the flock 
and been laid hold of by the wolves”.12  
 
In an 1834 letter to Carlyle, Mill accurately sketched the outlines of his later 
concern to provide a richer definition of happiness, gained only through 
autonomous self-development: 
 
“I am still, & am likely to remain, a utilitarian; though not one of “the 
people called utilitarians”…nor a utilitarian at all, unless in quite 
another sense from what perhaps any one except myself understands by 
the word…You will see…with what an immense number & variety of 
explanations my utilitarianism must be taken…Though I hold the good 
of the species…to be the ultimate end (which is the alpha and omega of 
my utilitarianism) I believe with the fullest belief that this end can in no 
other way be forwarded but by the means you speak of, namely by each 
taking for his exclusive aim the developement [sic] of what is best in 
himself.”13  
 
Mill had in fact already written a fairly stinging critique of Bentham’s 
thinking, for Bulwer’s England and the English, published in 1833. He took 
particular aim at Bentham’s insistence that private interest was the only 
‘spring of action’, as opposed to public spiritedness: 
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‘By the promulgation of such views of human nature, and by a general 
tone of thought and expression perfectly in harmony with them, I 
conceive Mr. Bentham’s writings to have done and be doing a very 
serious evil.’14 
 
Bulwer wanted to trumpet the piece, but Mill insisted it be buried as an 
Appendix, where it was safely ignored. Late in 1834, he flagged the article to 
John Nichol, shortly to be professor of astronomy at Glasgow University, but 
added: “It is not, and must not, be known to be mine.”15 He also admitted to 
Carlyle that the piece was his, but, he added “I do not acknowledge it, nor 
mean to do so”.16  
 
After the death of his father in 1836, Mill became much more open in 
expressing his growing doubts about utilitarianism and his attraction to 
elements of conservative thought  - in particular Coleridge’s emphasis on 
institutions, Carlyle’s on the importance of character and Tocqueville’s on the 
danger of a ‘tyranny of the majority’.  
 
His essay on Bentham, published in the London and Westminster Review in 
1838, contained a series of attacks on both the philosophical stance and 
conclusions of his former mentor. Setting his old mentor alongside Coleridge 
as one of “the two great seminal minds of England in their age”17, Mill praised 
Bentham’s work on legal philosophy and reform. But Bentham had fallen 
short on four fronts in particular: 
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i) He had failed, in his philosophical method, to “derive light from other 
minds”. Mill wrote: “His contempt of all other schools of thinkers; 
his determination to create a philosophy wholly out of the materials 
furnished by his own mind was his first disqualification as a 
philosopher”.18  
ii) Bentham’s utilitarianism was weakened by his emphasis on analyzing 
human behaviour in terms of self-interest: “Man is never 
recognized by [Bentham] as being capable of pursuing spiritual 
perfection as an end; of desiring, for its own sake, the conformity of 
his own character to his standard of excellence, without hope of 
good or fear of evil from other source than his own inward 
consciousness”.19 For Bentham, complained Mill, “man, that most 
complex being, is a very simple one.”  
iii) Bentham’s “principle of utility” lacked practical value since “utility, or 
happiness, is much too complex and indefinite an end to be sought 
except through the medium of various secondary ends, concerning 
which there may be, and often is, agreement among persons who 
differ in their ultimate standard.”20 Mill was here extending the 
argument he had first made in his 1833 review of Blakey’s History 
of Moral Science:  “The real character of any man’s ethical system 
depends not on his first and fundamental principle, which is of 
necessity so general as to be rarely susceptible of an immediate 
application to practice; but upon the nature of those secondary and 
intermediate maxims, vera illa et media axiomata, I which, as Bacon 
observes, real wisdom resides.”21 
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iv) Finally, Mill attacked Bentham’s insistent neutrality about the ethical 
value of different activities, encapsulated by his famous claim that 
poetry was no better than pushpin:  
 
“If he thought at all about any of the deeper feelings of human nature, it 
was but as idiosyncrasies of taste, with which the moralist no more than 
the legislator had any concern…To say either that man should, or that 
he should not, take pleasure in one thing, displeasure in another 
appeared to him [Bentham] as much an act of despotism in the moralist 
as in the political ruler.”22  
 
Given Mill’s upbringing and background, ‘Bentham’ was almost an act of 
treason. It would never have been published while either Bentham or James 
Mill were alive, as Mill himself hinted. After his father’s death, he wrote to a 
friend Edward Lytton Bulwer, about the greater freedom he would now 
enjoy, not least as editor of the Westminster: 
 
“As good may be drawn out of evil – the event which has deprived the 
world of the man of greatest philosophical genius it possessed…that 
same event has made it far easier to…soften the harder & sterner 
features of [the review’s] radicalism and utilitarianism…”23 
 
The Bentham review was the final straw for some of Mill’s former comrades-
in-arms. William Molesworth, a wealthy Benthamite, withdrew financial 
support for the review. Francis Place, a political radical and friend of Mill’s, 
lamented: “Mill has made great progress in becoming a German Metaphysical 
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Mystic”, and added that ‘excentricity (sic) and absurdity must sometimes be 
the result”.24 
 
In retrospect, Mill regretted his heretical attack. In the Autobiography (drafted 
in the mid 1850s) he wrote:  
 
“I have often felt that Bentham’s philosophy, as an instrument of 
progress, has been to some extent discredited before it had done its 
work, and that to lend a hand towards lowering its reputation was 
doing more harm than service to improvement.”25 
 
Mill appears, then, to have had two primary motives for summarizing his 
settled view in Utilitarianism, first published as a series of essays in 1861, but 
drafted many years earlier. First, he believed that with his father and 
Bentham gone, utilitarianism had been left without serious defenders: and 
that, given the value that he still saw in some elements of the philosophy into 
which he had been initiated as a youth, he should step up to the ramparts. 
Explaining his motives in 1858 to Theodor Gomperz, his German translator, 
he wrote, “there are not many defences [sic] extant of the ethics of utility”. To 
Charles Dupont-White in 1861 he explained that that “l’idée de l’Utile 
été…très impopulaire”.26 
 
Second, Mill was almost certainly moved to offer his defence in part to make 
amends for his earlier assaults. By the time Mill was writing, in the mid-1850s, 
Bentham’s philosophy had been dubbed a “pig philosophy” by Carlyle27 and 
was in some danger of falling into disrepute. The evidence for this motivation 
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is indirect, but quite strong: the marked change in tone in his treatment of 
utilitarianism between, especially, ‘Bentham’ and Utilitarianism; Mill’s public 
confession that he had prematurely ‘lent a hand’ in the ‘discrediting’ of the 
philosophy; and his personal regret at the state of the Benthamite ‘school’ (of 
which he had denied being a member), as reported to Dupont-White: ‘l’école 
de Bentham a toujours été regardée (je suis dis avec regret) comme une 
insignificante minorité.’28 
 
2.2 Aspirations 
 
It is clear, however, that Utilitarianism did not loom large in Mill’s mind. In a 
letter to Alexander Bain, on 15th October 1859, he described the work as ‘a 
little treatise”29. A few weeks later, also to Bain, he wrote: “I do not think of 
publishing my Utilitarianism till next winter at the earliest, though it is now 
finished…It will be but a small book…”30 To W.G. Ward, on 28th November 
1859, Mill described the work as a ‘little manuscript treatise’31.  
 
Mill rarely refers to the work without applying the epithet ‘little’, even 
though it was not much shorter than On Liberty. Without descending to 
psychobiography, this does appear to reveal something of Mill’s attitude to 
the work. 
 
Mill says that he left it to his publisher, John William Parker, to decide 
whether and when to publish the work as a separate volume, after the three-
part series in Frasers. He did: but for some reason, as Mill reported to Dupont-
White on 10 January 1862, there was a delay of almost two years. There is, 
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however, no record of Mill attempting to hurry publication, or even to inquire 
of Parker what was happening. To Dupont-White, he simply reported ‘je 
présume que cette réimpression est ajournée.”32  
 
Nor did Mill promote or engage with the work after publication. His attitude 
can only be described as ambivalent, bordering on dismissive. Here are five 
pieces of biographical evidence: 
 
i) Between the first publication of the essay and his death twelve years later, 
Utilitarianism is mentioned by Mill just eleven times in his correspondence, 
compared to thirty-three references to On Liberty.  
 
ii) In his Autobiography, in which Mill spends at least two pages each on The 
Slave Power (on the US Civil War), On Liberty and the Logic, just a few 
anodyne lines are devoted to Utilitarianism:  
 
“Soon after this time I took from their repository a portion of the 
unpublished papers which I had written during the last years of our 
married life, and shaped them, with some additional matter, into the 
little work entitled Utilitarianism; which was first published in three 
parts, in successive numbers of Fraser’s Magazine, and afterwards 
reprinted in a volume”.33 [my emphasis]. 
 
iii) Mill published many of his works – On Liberty and Principles of Political 
Economy for example – as cheap “people’s editions” (for which he received no 
royalties). But he never even considered doing so for Utilitarianism. One 
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might wonder if this was because he saw the subject matter as too technical or 
philosophical, but this cannot be the reason, because he did entertain the idea 
of one for his Logic34, a much more academic work. 
 
iv) In 1866, he asked Longman to send some free copies of his most important 
works to the Durham Cooperative Institute: Utilitarianism was not on the 
list.35 
 
v) As late as 1863, Mill was still apparently undecided about whether it was 
worth re-publishing the three pieces into the single volume. On 21 January 
1863, a month before the printing took place, he wrote to Samuel Bailey: 
 
‘If I reprint them separately as I am thinking about doing I will beg your 
acceptance of a copy.’36 [my emphasis] 
 
2.3 Investment 
 
Most importantly for the quality of the work, Mill’s detachment is revealed in 
his lack of subsequent editorial engagement. Typically, Mill would revise his 
work in light of criticism or in line with his evolving thinking. The only 
exception to this working method was On Liberty, and that was for an explicit 
reason: he considered the essay a monument to his wife, Harriet, ‘consecrated 
to her memory’. As he declared: ““I have made no alteration or addition to it, 
nor shall I ever.”37  
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But Utilitarianism was virtually unaltered, too. It ran to four editions during 
his lifetime, but Mill barely revised it, despite the considerable criticism it 
sustained.38 Of the changes that he made, just eight are of any substance. This 
treatment contrasts strongly with the editorial investments he made in the 
many editions of the Principles of Political Economy, the System of Logic and – 
perhaps most comparable - Representative Government, to which Mill made 105 
substantive changes for the second edition alone.39 
 
One example of editorial neglect stands out particularly starkly, given the 
intellectual history of the work. The weakness of Mill’s ‘proof’ of utility was 
immediately apparent, even to Mill’s allies. Theodor Gomperz pointed it out 
to him in 1863, just after first publication of the first edition of the book in 
February.40 According to Gomperz, Mill undertook to revise the passage: 
there is no letter to this effect, but as Mill dined with Gomperz in London on 
14th June 1963, it seems likely they discussed it then.41 
 
But Mill made no alterations, in either the second edition (1864) or the third 
(1867). In some frustration, Gomperz tried again in 1868 (18th March), as he 
was preparing a German translation:  
 
‘Let me conclude by expressing my regret that you did not in the later 
editions of the Utilitarianism remove the stumbling block…pp.51-52  1st 
ed. (audible, visible – desirable) which when pointed out to you by me, 
you said you would remove.”42 
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Mill’s reply (23rd April 1868), is unsatisfactory. He admits the problem, 
professes to have forgotten about it, claims he has been too busy in the 
preceding five years to address it, and then asks Gomperz to do it for him, in 
the German edition: 
 
 “With regard to the passage you mention in the Utilitarianism I have not 
had time regularly to rewrite the book & it had escaped my memory that 
you thought that argument apparently though not really fallacious 
which proves to me the necessity of, at least, some further explanation & 
development. I beg that in the translation you will kindly reserve the 
passage to yourself, & please remove the stumbling block, by expressing 
the real argument in such terms as you think will express it best.”43 [my 
emphasis]. 
 
Gomperz did not make any changes (in fact the translation into German was 
eventually undertaken by Eduard Wessel, under Gomperz’s supervision).44 
  
This is rather extraordinary. Mill is guilty with some version of philosophical 
misconduct. He admits that the ‘real argument’ is not captured by his original 
phrasing, and it must have been clear to him that this confusion had real 
implications, given the importance of the claim for his overall argument45. Yet 
he simply leaves it untouched. Gomperz, reasonably enough, leaves it, too: it 
was not his job or place to fix a problem of this kind. 
 
In a letter to Georg Brandes, in 1872, the penultimate year of his life, Mill 
showed that he was aware of the criticisms made of the work, but dismissed 
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them as ‘old’ and therefore unworthy of reply: ‘je n'a jugé à propos de 
répondre à aucune de ces attaques: aux vieux arguments il suffit des vieilles 
réponses.’46 
 
2.4 Implications 
 
A number of scholars, not least Alan Ryan and Wendy Donner, have worked 
hard to make a better job of presenting Mill’s mature utilitarianism than he 
managed himself in this essay.47 In the end, though, even the most careful 
rendering of his utilitarianism is hard to square with his liberalism. Mill 
wants people to be free, autonomous, self-cultivated and self-propelled. He 
believes – and hopes - that this will also make them ‘happy’, that it will 
provide ‘utility in the largest sense, grounded in the interests of man as a 
progressive being’.48 But there can be no doubt that Mill places much greater 
emphasis on liberty than utility: or put slightly differently, that his recast 
conception of ‘utility in the largest sense’ is very close to his conception of 
liberty. 
 
A biographical examination of the question makes it clear that by the time 
Mill wrote and published Utilitarianism, his heart wasn’t really in it – and 
that’s why it is, by his standards, a poor-quality piece of work.49  
 
Mil was moving on to an intellectual and political campaign for greater 
liberty. But the liberal emphasis of Mill’s last decade or so was, like the 
utilitarianism he was leaving behind, deeply influenced by his own story.  
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3. Liberalism 
 
In Chapter 11 of the main work, I summarise the key arguments and 
implications of the most famous expression of Mill’s ideas - On Liberty.1 Here, 
I will attempt to sustain my claim that additional insights can be gained into 
Mill’s liberalism by adopting a biographical viewpoint, in three areas in 
particular: 
 
3.1 Self-cultivation 
 
For Mill, the idea of individual growth, progress and cultivation was all-
important. Personal development was the measure and purpose of individual 
liberty.  
 
The concept of “remaking” strongly and permanently influenced Mill. His 
liberalism was founded on a conviction that the range of opportunities for 
self-creation, and autonomy were the standard against which cultures, 
political systems, economic institutions and philosophical ideas should be 
judged. When Mill argued against repression, he did not use spatial terms 
like “invade” or “interfere”. For him, repression inhibited natural growth, 
with people turned into “pollards”, or being “compressed”, “cramped”, 
pinched”, “dwarfed”, “starved” or “withered”.50 
 
A liberal society, for Mill, was one in which each person was free to progress 
“nearer to the best thing they can be”51. Mill prefixed his essay with what he 
                                                
1 VF, pp, 262-306 
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called a “motto”52 from Wilhelm von Humboldt’s Sphere and Duties of 
Government, published in 1854: “The grand, leading principle, towards which 
every argument unfolded in these pages directly converges, is the absolute 
and essential importance of human development in its richest diversity”.53 
Mill endorsed Humboldt’s claim that “the end of man…is the highest and 
most harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent 
whole”.54  
 
Here Mill was clearly able to draw a connection to his own life, and 
recreation. For him, self-development was a personal issue. He saw his own 
upbringing as constricted, especially emotionally. But he also believed his 
education had given him the resources to escape from the path on which he 
had been set. Mill described his journey to Carlyle: 
 
‘None however of them all has become so unlike what he once was as 
myself, who originally was the narrowest of them all…fortunately 
however I was not crammed; my own thinking faculties were called into 
strong though partial play; & by their means I have been able to remake 
all my opinions.’ [emphasis in the original]55  
 
3.2 Individuality 
 
Mill was home-schooled, in an environment where “the habitual 
frequenters…were limited to a very few persons”, did not go to university (in 
large part because his father and Jeremy Bentham thought it a waste of time), 
and worked for his entire career for the East India Company, the same 
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organisation that had employed his father. In fact he owed the job to his 
father:  
 
‘In May 1823, my professional occupation and status for the next thirty-
five years of my life, were decided by my father’s obtaining for me an 
appointment from the East India Company, in the office of the Examiner 
of India Correspondence, immediately under himself’.56 [my emphasis)] 
 
Mill as we have seen, was constantly suspected of being a ‘made man’. On the 
surface, his life decisions supported that assessment. Mill went from being 
home-schooled by his father for seventeen years, to being line-managed by 
his father for thirteen years, and then succeeding to his job on his death.  
 
It is worth reminding ourselves that for Mill, it was vitally important that 
individuals not only be authors of their opinions, but also architects of their 
lives:  
 
“He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life 
for him, has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of 
imitation. He who chooses his plan for himself employs all his 
faculties”.57  
 
It is hard to say that Mill chose ‘his plan for himself’. Nor though did he 
abandon the path on which he had been set even after his crisis. It is likely 
that the strong argument for individuality running through Mill’s liberalism 
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reflects, in part at least, his acute awareness of some of the limitations of his 
own life. 
 
3.3 Open-mindedness 
 
In On Liberty and elsewhere, Mill made an instrumental argument for free 
speech and the ‘collision of ideas’: debate was necessary to collectively 
generate, and regenerate, more robust truths. But elsewhere it is clear that for 
Mill, being open-minded, willing to examine one’s own beliefs, values and 
character - and if necessary change them – was a substantive element of what 
constitutes a full-developed character.  
 
Lack of open-mindedness was one of Mill’s central criticisms of both his 
father and Bentham. In his own escape from the intellectual confinement of 
narrow utilitarianism, Mill had swung to the other extreme, worshipping 
‘many-sidedness’, to use the term of Goethe’s that he adopted, almost to the 
exclusion of argument. 
 
In 1833 he explained to Carlyle that he was in a state of “recovery after the 
petrification of a narrow philosophy”58. Mill went on a few months later to 
describe how he had become: 
 
‘[C]atholic and tolerant in an extreme degree, and thought one-
sidedness almost the one great evil in human affairs…I scarcely felt 
called upon to deny anything but denial itself…I never, or rarely, felt 
myself called upon to come into collision with any one….there has been 
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on my part something like a want of courage in avoiding, or touching 
only perfunctorily, with you, points on which I thought it likely we 
should differ”59 [emphasis in original].  
 
After the narrowness of his own upbringing, Mill’s openness to ideas from 
any source, and willful desire to see both sides of a dispute, meant he was, as 
one modern scholar put it, “continually being hit by the boomerang of his 
own ideas”60.  
 
While Mill recovered some of his youthful intellectual confidence, he did not 
abandon his new-found respect for open-mindedness. He was disdainful of 
minds that he saw as closed. Mill attacked the Prime Minster George Canning 
for stating that he would always oppose widening the franchise:  
 
“[T]o hear a man gravely pledge himself to be always of the same 
opinion – bind himself by a solemn promise that the arguments which 
convince him now, upon his honour shall convince him to his dying day 
– that what he thinks advisable now he will think advisable always 
howsoever circumstances may change…is utterly ludicrous.’61  
 
In his diary, in 1854, Mill railed against the ideal of a cultivated individual as 
“rounded off and made symmetrical like a Greek temple or a Greek 
drama…Not symmetry, but bold, free expansion in all directions is 
demanded by the needs of modern life and the instincts of the modern 
mind.”62 
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It is hard to overstate the importance of this conviction to Mill’s philosophy 
and political theories. His epistemology relies on his liberalism – free speech 
is necessary for the collision of ideas, and those collisions promote the 
acquisition of rational knowledge. His political theory is underpinned by the 
need for public discourse and engagement rather than a ‘tyranny of the 
majority’ or dictatorship of the few. In On Liberty, Mill spells out his claim 
clearly: 
 
“[T]he source of everything respectable in man either as an intellectual 
or as a moral being, namely, [is] that his errors are corrigible. He is 
capable of rectifying his mistakes, by discussion and experience. Not by 
experience alone. There must be discussion, to show how experience is to be 
interpreted….In the case of any person whose judgment is really 
deserving of confidence, how has it become so?...Because he has felt, that 
the only way in which a human being can make some approach to knowing the 
whole of a subject, is by hearing what can be said about it by persons of every 
variety of opinion, and studying all modes in which it can be looked at by every 
character of mind. No wise man ever acquired his wisdom in any mode but 
this;…”63 [my emphases]. 
 
There is more than a hint of autobiography in this passage. Mill’s insistence 
on seeing all sides of an argument, learning from experience and history, 
questioning one’s own beliefs: all these stand in stark contrast to the approach 
and views of his father and Bentham. Mill gained independence in this way: 
and so he believes it is how all must do so. (Whether he is right about this is 
of course another matter.) 
30 
 
 
3.4 Character 
 
The most important work that Mill did not write was what he called ‘An 
Exact Science of Human Nature’. The work, as outlined in his System of Logic, 
would draw, he said, on the findings of psychology in order to discover the 
“[U]niversal laws of the Formation of Character”64:  
 
“The subject to be studied, is the origin and sources of all those qualities 
in human beings which are interesting to us, either as facts to be 
produced, to be avoided…and the object is to determine…what actual or 
possible combinations of circumstances are capable of promoting or of 
preventing the production of those qualities.”65  
 
As we have seen, for Mill, these questions were far from being merely 
technical or theological ones.  Given his own upbringing, and the accusations 
he faced of being a “made man” - a creature entirely of his father’s creation - 
he had to believe that he had broken free, that the path of his life had not been 
set by forces outside his control. Indeed, for Mill, “this feeling, of our being 
able to modify our character if we wish, is itself the feeling of moral freedom 
which we are conscious of.”66  
 
Mill had wished to modify his character, and had done so: and from this 
moment on the cultivation of character was the golden thread connecting 
every major element of his thinking. For him, ‘independent and vigorous’ 
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characters were essential for individual liberty, a balanced economy, gender 
equality and a vibrant democracy.67 
 
Mill is clear that he does not think the co-operation of the ‘mind in the 
formation of its own character’ will happen automatically. That is why, in his 
Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy, he insisted that we are all 
under a ‘moral obligation to seek the improvement of our own character’. 
Mill’s treatments of economic systems, the role of government, gender 
inequality, the place of religion, and the influence of culture, all include an 
strong reliance on the shaping of character: 
 
i) On communism as an economic and political system, from the 
Principles of Political Economy: “The question is, whether there 
would be any asylum left for individuality of character; whether 
public opinion would not be a tyrannical yoke; whether the 
absolute dependence of each on all, and surveillance of each by all, 
would not grind all down into a tame uniformity of thoughts, 
feelings and actions”.68 [my emphasis] 
ii) On the role of culture, rather than innate tendencies, in shaping 
character, as described in the Autobiography: “I have long felt that 
the prevailing tendency to regard all the marked distinctions of human 
character as innate [as]…one of the chief stumbling blocks to human 
improvement…”69 [my emphasis] 
iii) On how to evaluate the performance of government, from 
Representative Government: “the degree in which it tends to increase 
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the sum of good qualities in the governed, collectively and 
individually”.70 [my emphasis] 
iv) On the benefits of co-operatives or employee-owned companies, from 
the Principles of Political Economy:  “the healing of the standing feud 
between capital and labour…; and the conversion of each human 
being’s daily occupation into a school of the social sympathies and 
practical intelligence”.71 [my emphasis] 
v) On the artificially-generated differences between men and women, 
from the Subjection of Women:  
“[N]o one can safely pronounce that if women’s nature were left to 
choose its direction as freely as men’s, and if no artificial bent were 
attempted to be given to it except that required by the conditions of 
human society, and given to both sexes alike, there would be any 
material difference, or perhaps any difference at all, in the character and 
capacities which would unfold themselves.”72 [my emphasis] 
vi) On the usefulness of religion, from Three Essays on Religion. Old-style 
Christianity bred passivity, fatalism and prejudice, but a reformed 
version held out the prospect of an “an increased inducement to 
cultivate the improvement of character”:73 
 
It would be a worthwhile scholarly endeavour to attempt to re-create the 
work Mill never completed. It will not, of course, be an ‘exact science’: it 
could not have been in Mill’s time, and certainly not today.  
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Left to his own devices, it is probable that Mill would in fact have produced 
such a work. In February 1854, Mill reminded Harriet of the list that they had 
compiled together of his next writing tasks:  
 
“Differences of character (nation, race, age, sex, temperament). Love. 
Education of tastes. Religion de l’Avenir. Plato. Slander. Foundation of 
morals. Utility of religion. Socialism. Liberty. Doctrine that causation is 
will. To these I have now added from your letter: Family, & 
Conventional.”74  
 
Mill seemed inclined to tackle the first, a treatment of character formation – 
which he had been saying was essential since the publication of the Logic 
more than a decade earlier: 
 
“It will be a tolerable two years work to finish all that? Perhaps the first 
of them is the one I could do most to by myself, at least of those equally 
important”. 75 
 
But in her reply of Harriet steered him in a different direction:  
 
 ‘About the Essays dear, would not Religion, the Utility of Religion, be 
one of the subjects you would have most to say on …[?]’76 
 
Mill did as advised, and on 6th March wrote: 
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‘I have fairly set to at another essay, on the subject you suggested. I 
wrote several hours at it yesterday, after turning it over mentally many 
days before…”77 
 
It is a pity that Mill was diverted. While his  thoughts on religion are 
interesting in themselves, they add little to the structure of his thought. As we 
have seen, Utilitarianism was a decidedly mixed blessing. The Chapters on 
Socialism, published after Mill’s death, added only slightly to his Principles, at 
least as he revised them. A sustained treatment of the formation of character, 
however – his long-promised ‘Ethology’ - would have filled a significant hole 
in the architecture of Mill’s thought.  
 
 
4. Harriet’s Influence 
 
The question of how far Harriet Taylor influenced Mill’s thinking was a live 
one during their lives. Godefroy Cavaignac, a French refugee and leading 
light in the Societe[accents] des Droits de ‘Homme  dubbed her “the Armida of 
the London and Westminster”78.  
 
Harriet’s role has occupied the attention of scholars since. For some, 
everything from the Principles onwards should be read as at the very least a 
joint production, and quite possibly as Harriet’s thoughts flowing through 
Mill’s pen. Nicholas Capaldi suggests Harriet was a ‘great influence’ on Mill’s 
life and thought; for Jo Ellen Jacobs, their work, ‘beginning with the Principles 
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of Political Economy, tended more and more towards co-authorship’. Hayek 
devoted a book to the subject.  
 
According to Michael Packe, Harriet wielded an “astounding, almost 
hypnotic control of Mill’s mind”79. Packe also claimed for Harriet a good deal 
of the credit for Mill’s subsequent essays – especially On Liberty and The 
Subjection of Women: “In so far as Mill’s influence, theoretic or applied, has 
been of advantage to the progress of the western world, or indeed of 
humanity at large,” he wrote, “the credit should rest upon his wife at least as 
much as himself.”80 [my emphasis] 
 
In private and in public, Mill was at pains to emphasise Harriet’s unique 
brilliance, eclipsing his own merely workmanlike abilities. Sometimes he did 
in fact position himself as a mere translator of her thoughts, as her 
amanuensis, likening her at one point to Bentham, “the originating mind”, 
and himself to Dumont, the French translator of Bentham’s Traite de 
Legislation.81 
 
“Unfortunately for both,” recounted Bain, “he outraged all reasonable 
credulity in describing her matchless genius, without being able to supply 
corroborating evidence”.82 
 
Bain was right; there is not much corroborating evidence for such grandiose 
claims. Nonetheless, Harriet did have an influence on Mill in a number of 
areas. A greater understanding of these helps to illuminate certain aspects of 
Mill’s thought.  
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4.1 Custom 
 
Mill and Harriet suffered from the gossip and social exclusion during the 
years of their unusual relationship while Harriet’s husband was still alive.2 
Unsurprisingly, they shared a strong fear and dislike of the power of custom. 
 
It is difficult in the early years of their relationship to disentangle the effects of 
Harriet on Mill, from those of Mill on Harriet. A review by Harriet of Sarrans’ 
Louise Phillipe and the Revolution of 1830 has clear Millian markings. Or put 
differently, the quotes from Harriet’s essay lamenting the “phantom power” 
of the “opinion of society”, and the centrality of “self-dependence” could be 
dropped unnoticed into almost any paragraph in “On Genius” - or indeed On 
Liberty.83  
 
An unpublished essay of Harriet’s from the early 1830s (it is not dated but is 
on paper watermarked ‘1832’) describes the ‘spirit of conformity’ as: 
 
‘[T]he root of all intolerance…what is called the opinion of society is a 
phantom power, yet as is often the case with phantoms, of more force 
over the minds of the unthinking than all the flesh and blood arguments 
which can be brought to bear against it. It is a combination of the many 
weak, against the few strong...” 
 
Harriet also stressed the importance of strong individual characters:  
                                                
2 VF, pp. 89-91 
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‘The remedy is, to make all strong enough to stand alone; and whoever 
has once known the pleasure of self-dependance, [sic] will be in no 
danger of lapsing into subserviency.”84 
 
It seems clear that the couple were reinforcing each other view’s on this 
subject from the very beginning.  
 
4.2 Socialism 
 
Mill added an informal dedication to the first edition of his Principles of 
Political Economy. (It was pasted into limited numbers of copies, rather than 
printed, to spare the blushes of her husband):  
 
“To Mrs John Taylor/As the most eminently qualified of all persons 
known to the author either to originate or to appreciate speculations on 
social improvement, this attempt to explain and diffuse ideas many of 
which were first learned from herself, is with the highest respect and 
regard dedicated.”85  
 
This description of Harriet’s influence on the Principles is hugely overstated, 
especially with regard to the first edition. However, by 1851, as a fully-
engaged intellectual partner, Harriet was having a more direct impact – 
especially on the heated issue of socialism.  
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In the Autobiography, Mill reflected that in the first edition of the Principles, the 
“difficulties of Socialism were so strongly stated, that the tone was on the 
whole that of opposition to it”.86 With Harriet’s advice, he set about shifting 
the balance. In 1849 he reassured Harriet that “progress of the right kind 
seems to me quite safe now that Socialism has become inextinguishable.”87. Mill 
declared that the substantial changes made for the third edition of the 
Principles had to wait until the couple had enough time together to work on 
the necessary changes. When they did, the alteration of Mill’s stance towards 
socialism was marked. Harriet herself suggested the chapter on the “Futurity 
of the Labouring Classes”, which dealt more directly with socialism, and, 
according to Mill, heavily influenced its content.  
 
The evidence of their correspondence is that Harriet was consistently more 
socialist in her thinking than Mill, and that she moved him in that direction. 
But the movement should not be overstated: in was one of degrees. And there 
were a number of issues where they disagreed, and where Mill’s position was 
the one that ended up on the page.88 
 
4.3 Markets 
 
A specific issue demonstrates the reality and limits of Harriet’s influence – the 
regulation of working hours. In the Principles, Mill used legal limits on 
working hours as an example of potentially legitimate state interference to 
solve a collective action problem. 
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Mill saw this as an issue that served “to exemplify the manner in which 
classes of persons may need the assistance of law, to give effect to their 
deliberate collective opinion of their own interest….”89 It was only an 
illustration, however, and Mill was uneasy about legislation in this area.  
 
But Harriet was in the interventionist camp. In 1849, she wrote to Mill:  
 
“Among other trash did you observe Hume said – ‘To interfere with the 
labour of others…is a direct violation of the fundamental laws of society. 
What a text this would be for an article which however no newspaper 
would publish. Is not the Ten Hours’ Bill an ‘interference &c &c’?”90  
 
Mill did not reply to Harriet on this point – or if he did, the letter has been 
lost. In fact, he was ambivalent about the Ten Hours Bill, seeing it as part of 
the wrong-headed philanthropy of the ruling classes.91  
 
In revisions to his Principles, Mill returned to the passage on working hours. It 
seems probable that Harriet’s enthusiasm for regulation influenced the slight 
alteration in his treatment of the point in the third edition, published in 1852, 
when he replaced “I do not mean to express an opinion in favour of such an 
enactment’ with the softer “I am not expressing any opinion in favour of such 
an enactment.” 
 
It is also likely that, even as Mill’s doubts grew, he was reluctant to return to 
the topic with Harriet at his side. But when it was time for a new edition in 
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1862 edition - the first to appear after Harriet’s death – he added the following 
caveat:  
 
“…which has never been demanded, and which I certainly should not, 
in present circumstances, recommend.”92  
 
What this example shows is that Harriet certainly influenced Mill, not least 
through their ongoing intellectual engagement, but certainly did not dictate to 
him. 
 
4.4 Ballot 
 
One of the most marked changes of opinion by Mill was in his attitude 
towards the ‘ballot’ (ie. the secret ballot, or right to vote in privacy). In the 
1830s he was faithful to the radical demand for its introduction. Indeed he 
wrote to Tocqueville in 1837 that with the introduction of the ballot: 
 
“reform will have finally triumphed;: the aristocratical principle will be 
completely annihilated, & we shall enter into a new era of government’93 
 
But in ‘Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform’, published in 1859, Mill 
performed a volte-face:  
 
“Thirty years ago, the main evil to be guarded against was that which 
the ballot would exclude – coercion by landlords, employers, and 
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customers. At present, I conceive, a much greater source of evil is the 
selfishness, or the selfish partialities of the voter himself”.94 
 
The vote should therefore be cast with a degree of public-spiritedness, not 
based on purely personal calculations. Being “under the eyes of others” and 
having “to give an account of their conduct”95 would, Mill now believed, 
encourage the right spirit in the voter.  
 
Mill’s former radical comrades-in-arms were displeased. “If James Mill could 
have anticipated that his son John Stuart should preach so abominable a 
heresy,“ fumed Francis Place, “he would have cracked his skull.”96  
 
What changed? In a single word: Harriet. She was fiercely opposed to the idea 
of a secret ballot, which flew in the face of her ideal of strong, independent 
citizens standing up for their beliefs. The evidence suggests strongly that she 
was able to convert Mill to her view.  
 
In the Autobiography, Mill describes the change of heart revealed in the essay: 
 
‘Its principal features were, hostility to the Ballot (a change of opinion in 
both of us, in which she rather preceded me) and a claim of representation 
for minorities’.97 [my emphasis] 
 
It is clear not only that Harriet helped to convince Mill on this question, but 
that she was much keener to publicise the U-turn. Mill was content to make 
his argument about the ballot in the course of a longer essay, in a volume to 
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be published at some date in the future. He was justifiably concerned about 
giving too much succour to the political enemy, especially at time when some 
degree of reform seemed possible.  
 
Harriet, by contrast, wanted to devote an article specifically to the question - 
and sooner rather than later. Two letters from Mill to Harriet show the 
difference, the first dated 24 June 1854: 
 
“I reckon on leaving our opinion on that question [the ballot] to form 
part of the volume of essays, but I am more anxious to get on with other 
things first, since what is already written [the draft of ‘Thoughts on 
Parliamentary Reform’]…will in case of the worst suffice, being the 
essentials of what we have to say, & perhaps might serve to float the 
volume as the opinion on the ballot would be liked by the powerful classes, and 
being from a radical would be sure to be quoted by other writers, while they 
would detest most of the other opinions’.98[my emphasis] 
 
Harriet’s intervening letter is not extant, but she argued for swifter 
publication, as Mill’s next letter (30 June 1854) makes clear: 
 
 I do not feel in the way you do the desirableness of writing an article for 
the Ed[inbugh Review] on it. There will be plenty of people to say all 
that is to be said against the ballot – all it wants from us is the authority 
of an ancient radical & that it will have by what already written and fit 
to be published as it is...”99  
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Mill got his way: and as far as the extant correspondence shows, they never 
discussed the timing or form of publication again. This is a good example of 
the workings of the relationship. Harriet was an intellectual partner, and in 
this instance a strong enough one to alter his opinion. But Mill resisted strong 
pressure from Harriet to publish the new arguments sooner, or in a more 
attention-grabbing fashion. 
 
4.5 Feminism  
 
Stefan Collini suggests that “any complete account of Mill’s thinking on the 
subject of women would have to come to terms with the role of this very 
clever, imaginative, passionate, intense, imperious, paranoid, unpleasant 
woman”.100 Collini is right about taking into account Harriet’s views when 
considering Mill’s feminism: but for what it is worth, the evidence on 
Harriet’s pleasantness is inconclusive. (Even today, it seems, Harriet Taylor 
Mill can provoke strong reactions.) 
 
Mill was a strong supporter of gender equality before he met Harriet. Indeed, 
it marked the first real breach with his father’s opinions, at least as Mill 
recounted it in his Autobiography. While considering (at that stage) James 
Mill’s Essay on Government to be a ‘masterpiece’, Mill reports that he ‘most 
positively dissented [from]…the paragraph, in which he maintains that 
women may consistently with good government, be excluded from the 
suffrage, because their interest is the same as men.” Nor was the 
disagreement trifling: for the young Mill, the falseness of this claim was “as 
great an error as any of those against which the Essay was directed”.101  
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Of course, Mill could have been projecting his later feminism back on his 
teenage self: but there is other evidence suggesting a commitment to women’s 
rights, even at this young age.102 
 
There is no question, however, that Mill’s feminism was amplified and 
deepened by Harriet. It was her most passionate cause. And in addressing 
issues such as marriage and divorce, and women’s property rights, both of 
them were also tackling deeply personal matters, given their own painful 
circumstances.  
 
In the early stages of their relationship, they exchanged notes about their 
views on marriage – much of which would, in adapted form, find its way into 
the Subjection of Women.103 The couple also worked directly together on the 
issue of women’s rights, and produced a series of working notes, which seem 
to date from the late 1850s  - the only extant example of work that is clearly 
jointly produced. 
 
It also seems unlikely that without Harriet at his side, Mill would have spent 
hours making the language of the third edition of the Principles gender-
neutral, replacing hundreds of instances of the word “his” with “their”104. 
 
While Mill became an important figure in the development of women’s rights, 
leading the charge for women’s suffrage in parliament – I label him the 
‘Father of Feminism’ in the main work – he lagged behind Harriet in terms of 
radicalism.  
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First, Mill was more cautious than Harriet about expressing the full extent of 
his views. In 1850, rather than submitting an article on the subject to the 
Westminster Review, he turned in an article of Harriet’s, which they titled ‘The 
Emancipation of Women’ but was published in 1851 under the less ambitious 
title “The Enfranchisement of Women”.  
 
Harriet drew a parallel between the position of women and black slaves, and 
criticized the “unjust…prejudice of custom” which permitted one group of 
society the right to decide for another “what is and is not their ‘proper 
sphere’“.105 Many of the article’s themes would in fact be echoed in Mill’s own 
The Subjection of Women – but nineteen years later. 
 
Second, on at least one substantive issue, Harriet was much more advanced 
than Mill: the gendered division of labour, especially in relation to 
childrearing. In her 1851 essay, Harriet insisted that: 
 
“[I]t is neither necessary nor just to make imperative on women that 
they shall be either mothers or nothing, or that ifthey have been mothers 
once, they shall be nothing else during the whole remainder of their 
lives.”106  
 
By contrast, the impact of maternity on the opportunities for public and 
labour market participation is barely mentioned by Mill. And in Subjection, he 
took a fairly conservative view of women’s domestic labour:  
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“[T]he common arrangement, by which the man earns the income and 
the wife superintends the domestic expenditure [is]…in general the 
most suitable division of labour between the two persons.”107  
 
Mill’s concern was that women who attempted to do paid work and raise 
children would end up failing in the latter, vitally important, task. The fact 
that they were in the labour market, Mill noted, “seldom relieved” women 
from being expected to perform in full “the ordinary functions of mistress of a 
family”: but it would probably “prevent her from performing [them] 
properly”.108  
 
Modern feminist scholars, including Susan Okin and Julia Annas, claim that 
Mill “never questioned or objected to the maintenance of traditional sex 
roles”.109 This is a fair criticism. A defence is that he was writing and 
campaigning in the middle of the 19th century – and that the endurance of 
gendered roles to this day shows that they are not to be easily overturned. On 
the other hand, it cannot be claimed that he was not forced to think about this 
issue, given Harriet’s strong and clear position. Mill’s feminism is, to this 
extent, incomplete. This is doubly unfortunate, given that the ‘tyranny of 
custom’ against which he railed in On Liberty was most obviously being 
exercised to reinforce the inequalities he dramatised in the Subjection of 
Women.  
 
In these five key areas, Harriet had a demonstrable influence on the 
development of Mill’s ideas. But in a sense, even these discoveries fail to do 
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her justice. Above all she was an engaged, passionate, supportive intellectual 
partner: for Mill, nothing could have been more important. 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
Turning to biography to illuminate philosophy is a delicate enterprise. There 
is a real danger of reaching for a biographical explanation of each and every 
idea: ‘Of course, he only thought X because he was doing Y.’ But philosophers 
are flesh and blood like the rest of us, and it is likely that their work is 
influenced by their own life, in varying ways and to varying degrees. There is 
more value in biography than can be gleaned, for instance, from Martin 
Heidegger’s 1924 biography of Aristotle: ‘The man was born, he worked, and 
then died’.  
 
The extent to which the life is implicated in the thoughts depends to a very 
large extent on the thinker. The lives of Socrates, Mill, Rousseau, Berlin and 
Sen offer us more insight into their philosophy than, say, the lives of Aristotle, 
Hume, Jevons, Green or Dworkin. And even for the most intensely 
autobiographical thinker, the life will only ever offer a slighter greater 
illumination of work that must, regardless, also be judged as it stands alone. 
 
In the main work, and this essay, I have attempted to use biography to throw 
a little more light – or at least a different light – on the ideas of just one 
philosopher, John Stuart Mill. As he wrote, in almost the final words of On 
Liberty: ‘it really is of importance, not only what men do, but also what 
manner of men they are that do it”.110 
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